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In respertful memory of JusticeBenjamin N.
Cardozo, jurist, philosopher, humanitarian
and man of letters, we republish his inspir-

ing address* to our first graduating class in
1928. No words can honor him so adequately

as his own. No eulogy can proclaim his position among the immortals so eloquently and

so convincingly as his tribute to our Lady of
the Common Law. As words of wisdom are
eternal so in like manner is the memory of

their gifted author.

O

OUK LADY OF THE COMMON LAW
uR Lady of the Common Law has indeed no lack of

wooers.
Three years ago the word went forth that there was to
be opened a new shrine to be devoted to her cult. She would
not show her face to any who failed to prove their worth. She
would not be won by amorous glances or soulful prayers or
threats or sighs or groans. Comely looks would be lost upon
her, and so would riches and birth and all the accidents of
fortune. Nothing would avail except service in her cause,
service not for a day or a month, but for three long years of
vigil and devotion. Behold a marvel happened! Hardly had
the word gone forth before a band of worshippers had gathered. They were eight hundred strong the first year. With
each succeeding year, the volume swelled. Now the triennial
term has ended; and here in this hall, the faithful have been
brought together to claim the guerdon of their toil, the privilege of enrollment among our Lady's well beloved, the servants of her law.
* Originally published in pamphlet form by St. John's University School

of Law.
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I speak of it as a service not ended, but persisting. If
you have fancied it was ended, you have been a victim of the
Lady's wiles. Like other flirts and beauties, she can speak
with a double meaning, and is not above playing a sly trick
on those whose sighs and service are offered at her feet. I
give you warning now lest you become dupes of her caprice.
Do not think for a moment that the three years of devotion
that have been given for the bare and meagre privilege of
being numbered on her roll,-do not think that these exhaust
the measure of your sacrifice. What has been endured is
merely a novitiate, a term of test and trial, a period of probation in which slackers may fall aside, and the strong and
brave and earnest be left within the ranks. The truth is that
our Lady is growing more exacting with the years. When I
was placed upon her roll these many years ago, she was content with very little. The barest rudiments of law sufficed to
give to the acolyte of those days the privilege to kiss the hem
of her flowing and unspotted robe. But it is otherwise in this
year of grace. Our Lady of the Common Law-I say it with
the humility that is due from an old and faithful servantour Lady in these days is no longer an easy one to please. She
has become insatiate in her demands. Not law alone, but
almost every branch of human knowledge, has been brought
within her ken, and so within the range of sacrifice exacted
of her votaries. Those who would earn her best rewards must
make their knowledge as deep as the science and as broad and
universal as the culture of their day. She will not be satisfied
with less.
I was reading the other day a very interesting document,
the report for the academic year of 1926-27 made to the Overseers of Harvard University by the President of the University, Dr. A. Lawrence Lowell. He speaks of a new educational
concept, the concept, as he calls it, of the continuity of knowledge. The idea is taking root that the subdivisions of education like those of time itself have been treated too often as
absolute and genuine,-that there is need to recognize them
more fully as mere figments of the brain, mere labor-saving
devices, helps to thinking, but, like other helps to thinking,
misleading if their origin is neglected or forgotten. Thus it is
that the physicist is learning from the chemist, the zoologist
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from the botanist, the economist from the statesman and the
student of social science, the physician from the psychologist,
and so on interchangeably and indefinitely. "The sharp severance," we are told, "is giving way, and we perceive that all
subjects pass imperceptibly into others previously distinct."
Something of this same concept of the continuity of knowledge is making its way into the law. In my own court at a
recent session, we had one case where a wise decision called
for the wisdom of a chemist; another for that of one skilled
in the science of mechanics; another for that of the student
of biology and medicinei and so on through the list. I do
not say we were able to supply this fund of wisdom out of the
resources of our knowledge, yet, in theory at least, the litigants before us were entitled to expect it, and our efficiency
as judges would be so much the greater, the quality of the
output so much the sounder and richer, in proportion to our
ability to make the theory one with fact. Of course, complete
knowledge of the body of organized learning is an unrealized
achievement. So vain an aspiration is not to fret our waking
hours. We cannot sound the depths; there will be strain
enough upon our energies if we do so much as skim the surface. Even to do this, however, there is need for an equipment of learning fuller by far and richer than any that was
exacted of the bar of simpler days. Few of us can hope to
solve for ourselves the problems that perplex the historian or
the economist or the physician or the chemist. We shall have
to look to the expert for a definitive answer to the queries that
are proper to his chosen field. The point is, however, that
without a full and rich background of knowledge and culture
in fields foreign to the law itself, we shall never reach the perception of the problems to be solved. We shall never see it in
its true relation to the lives of those about us, and missing its
relation to life, we shall miss its relation to the law, which is
to give the rule of life. One must know the method of approach if one would hope to gain the goal. The concept of
the continuity of knowledge is teaching us day by day the
need for an enriched equipment, and is pointing the path to
be followed by the lawyer of tomorrow.
Let me not seem to stress the element of knowledge to the
exclusion of all else. Knowledge is indeed an important part
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of our equipment, yet knowledge is not the whole. At an hour
like this, the fitting thing perhaps is to lay the weight of
emphasis on other strains and elements that unite to form
the blend. I was told when I was asked to talk to you today
that this was to be a sort of uplift meeting to bring home to
us all, and, in particular to the fledglings of the bar,-to
bring home in a vivid way the dignity and glory of the profession of the law, its capacities realized and unrealized for
service to mankind. I gathered that somehow or other it was
my duty to talk at such a time, however great my dread of
speeches, and my resistance was broken down by the covert
suggestion that if I failed to talk today-however silent I
might be through the other days of the year-if I failed to
talk today, 'I should be recusant to the great trust that has.
been laid upon me as the titular chief-though chief in no
other way-of the judicial system of the state.
So I come before you here charged with a duty to rehearse the ancient platitudes. I do not mean by that epithet
to cheapen or deride them. We are wont to call things platitudes when we know them to be truths, but have a disagreeable sense that we have failed to live up to them altogether
in the conduct of our lives. Perhaps it will be easier, if only
we call them platitudes, to silence or forget them. We have
a nameless feeling of irritation and discomfort, as if there
were a challenge to our virtue, when they are ding-donged in
our ears with provocative iteration. Not for me today are
these hesitations and misgivings. Today I am commissioned
to be as stale and unoriginal as I please, and to count the
yawns of my audience as proof of duty done.
So, of course, they often are. The bores of the hour have
often been the heroes of the future. Socrates was voted by the
Athenians to be a horrid old bore who deserved nothing better
than his hemlock. He has been rewarded for his boredom by
an immortality which even we may miss. Boswell was a bore
who was snubbed for his pains by the man he was exalting.
He has had his reward in winning immortality for himself
and incidentally perhaps for the snubber too. I suppose
judges, or nearly all of them, are bores. Outside of the pages
of Judge Holmes, who is in a class by himself, I am not aware
that men resort to the opinions of the courts as a spiritual
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elixir in hours of depression. So I console myself with the
thought that if I preach sterile truths, I shall be playing true
to form.
I suppose the traditional thing to say to the young men
of the bar with the future yet before them is that what counts
above all else is character. That is a tiresome thing to say
because it has been said so often, and I wouldn't say it now if
I hadn't received a license to make myself a bore. With this
license accorded to me, I feel I must say it because it happens
to be true. Character includes many things, industry and
fidelity as well as conscience and honor. At the'one end of
the scale are the Poor Richard maxims of frugality and diligence and at the other the sacrifice and devotion and idealism
of saints and heroes. Those who fancy that success comes by
chance might learn something from the life of Lord Cairns,
who became Lord Chancellor of England, and one of the most
famous of English judges. His biographer records the fact
that when Cairns was called to the bar, he set himself to
practice with all his solemn earnestness. "No reason or excuse did he allow himself to leave the precincts of the law
while a barrister might be expected to remain there." It was
this circumstance, we are told, that gave him an early start.
Let the week-end golfers of our day take heed! "He had declined an invitation for a Saturday, though he had no work
to do, and was sitting in his chambers close on four in the
afternoon when the unexpected happened. An eminent advocate, Mr. Gregory of Bedford Row, had a sudden occasion to
consult counsel. He tried many chambers only to find them
closed. "At last," says the biographer, "he came to the address where Cairns was keeping his lonely vigil and found,
not merely a barrister, but the barrister for whom solicitors
are looking-a young man of ripe learning and sound judgment. From that day Mr. Gregory's firm were constant
clients." Here is a good instance of the rewards that come to
the faithful and steady practice of those qualities of sobriety
and diligence which I placed at the lower end of the scale of
virtues appropriate to beginners at the bar. But there are
shining instances too of rewards, more splendid even and
enduring, that attend the practice of other virtues, the virtues
at the upper end of this great chromatic scale.. Think of the

ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW

[ VOL. 13

glory that is still shed upon our judicial history by the
example of Lord Mansfield, and the fame of his unyielding
honor. I like to retell the tale, so often told before, of his
conduct during the anti-papist riots of 1780. The mob, instigated by Lord George Gordon, destroyed his house, looted its
contents, and ruined his law library, the law books which he
had annotated with jealous care. Such was his reputation for
judicial impartiality that the leader of the mob elected to be
tried before him, and not before some other judge. When it
was over, there was no challenge, even from the prisoner, of
the fairness of the trial. Character had triumphed over prejudice and passion.
I take comfort in memories like these when I am told,
as I often am, that lawyers and judges are brakes, and oldfashioned ones at that upon the forward movement of the
race. I was reading not long ago,-it happened to be New
Year's Eve, when I was preparing the usual stock of resolutions for the future--I was reading an indictment of the legal
mind in the days of Voltaire, which expanded itself into one
of the legal mind generally. "Reverence," said the author,
"for precedent, attachment to the letter of the law, the effort
to bend changed ways of life to obsolete statutes, habits of
chop-logic, pedantry and cynicism masquerading as austerity,
habitual distrust of human nature and of generous impulses,
professional vanity, all these render members of the legal
profession liable to fanatical reaction, to frigid cruelty, to
oppressive injustice in an often honest passion for social
order."
This was salutary reading for New Year's Eve, if a penitential state of mind might be expected to yield a fair crop
of goodly resolutions for the year about to start. Sobering as
the indictment was, I found another book more chastening,
more provocative of thought and introspection and humility.
You will find a series of essays, gathered together under the
title Historical Trials, the work of the late Sir John MacDonnell, who in his life was King's Remembrancer and senior
Master of the Supreme Court of Judicature. His theme is
one that is never stale, the correspondence between law and
justice, the extent to which courts do in very truth fulfill the
function of their being, and this not in fair weather, but in
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foul, in times of stress and strain, when the legal mechanism
should hold good against passion and prejudice and cruelty,
and show what it can do. I admit that the record is not a soil
for smooth and joyous gratulation. It is a challenge to one
and all of us. Remember, if you please, that the author is no
muckraker, but a skilled and scholarly lawyer, and himself a
cog in the law machine of a progressive and enlightened country. Here gathered together in a slender volume are the trials
of Socrates, the Knights Templars, Jeanne d'Arc, Giordano
Bruno, Mary Queen of Scots, Galileo, Servetus, Katharine of
Aragon, Sir Walter Raleigh, the witchcraft trials and others.
"A trial," says our author, "a trial is in substance a struggle,
a battle in a closed arena. It is a shock of contending forces,
a contest which may arouse the fiercest passions. The issues
involved in the trial, say of Socrates, of Jeanne d'Arc, of
Bruno, or Calas, or Dreyfus, are among the deepest and greatest known to humanity. I would not, even if I could, deal
with them. They are above my task. They are for the philosopher, the historian, the moralist. I approach these trials,"
he continues, "solely as a lawyer examining the documents
as a lawyer; trying to find answers to questions which a
lawyer must put, necessarily passing over many of the greatest aspects of such trials, but also perhaps adverting to some
apt to be ignored. I want to look at these cases just as if they
were about to come into court, or had just been decided; to
view them as legal phenomena, part of the legal history of
men, not the least part of the long story of the evolution of
the human conscience."
Take the first trial that he gives us, the trial of Socrates;
will its lessons ever fade?
"I come to the questions," says Sir John, "which twenty
centuries have reiterated and which are still fresh. Was it a
fair trial? Was Socrates guilty? Was the defense a long
sophism? Did he corrupt the youth? Was the result a judicial error or a judicial murder? I do not believe that to these
questions there ever will be one answer. There will always be
those who prize order, the interests of the community, above
all else; who make the safety of the State the supreme law;
and they will answer, as did Hegel, as many others have done
since, 'It was a good deed' a necessary deed; Socrates must
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die that the people might live and be strong.' That was the
opinion of the majority of his fellow citizens; and there is no
reason to believe that they repented, at all events until long
afterwards. * * * If the prosecution and condemnation of
Socrates were acts of State, they were at least done decently
and in order, and with no desire to stifle the voice of the
victim, and there are none of the circumstances of brutality
which I shall often have to note in medieval and modern
trials. That is one view of the trial still often expressed. But
there will always be others who prizing individual freedom
and the inner life above all things, thinking much of the
invisible and imponderable things about us, will regard the
result as a crime, the victim as the first and greatest martyr
for true freedom and true progress. In the presence of these
antinomics among the irreconcilable things of life, the mere
lawyer cannot give much assistance. But he will try to put
himself in the position of the judges, and seek to understand
the law which they administered; he will apply to their conduct the tests, not of our time, but of their own. And he will
also put to himself the question: would the results have differed if Socrates had been tried elsewhere and at some other
time?"
Sir John's answer to the question is not one to kindle
the pride of our profession. Socrates put on trial elsewhere
and at some other time might have fared, in Sir John's judgment, no better, perhaps worse. Later days would have
brought torture, and still later days contempt and ostracism
and misunderstanding and belittlement. The indictment
would have been cast in other moulds and the penalty would
have been less than death; but law would still have been used
to sanctify the prejudices and hatreds of the hour, and to
crush the weakling who resists them. With impressive force
our author sums up the lesson to be drawn from his studies;
and the lesson is one of the corroding power of fear-fear of
the unknown and the strange and the prejudice that goes
with fear. "Fear," he says, "brings back the primitive conception of the function of courts; not necessarily, or indeed
often, personal fear, but fear of changes; fear on the part of
the upholders of the old order; fear of the effects of the discoveries of new truths; fear of emerging into the full light.
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Where such fear is, justice cannot be; a court becomes an
instrument of power; judges are soldiers putting down rebellion; a so-called trial is a punitive expedition or a ceremonial
execution-it.s victim a Bruno, a Galileo, or a Dreyfus."
I do not know whther it can ever be different, or so at
least I say in hours of depression. Perhaps this is what law
means. It is the medium, the instrument, by which society
represses conduct which awakens fear of such intensity as to
make tolerance impossible. We shall rationalize law only
when we rationalize our fears-our fears and our wishes, the
counterpart of our fears. I heard a distinguished physician
say the other day that psychologists were coming over to the
view that the fruitful method of education is not so much to
control the behavior of men as to direct their desires-their
impulses and desires. He put it in such a way as to challenge
my interest and attention, but the thought is now becoming a
commonplace of the schools. There is a lesson in all this for
the law and for those who follow the law as judges and as
advocates. In directing desires-in rationalizing hopes and
fears-in shaping and guiding character, we shall be doing
something more, we shall be rationalizing law.
So the problem, as I said at the beginning, is one of
character, which turns out in the end to be the key to behavior and so to social order. How does it stand with us
today, with us of the legal profession, with us whose business
it is to see that law is rational? How have we fulfilled our
task? Has fear, unworthy fear, been cast out of our juristic
methods? Is law the instrument of the passion or the guile
or the craftiness of the hour, or of its serenity and peace and
order? Has it been purged and sanctified and dignified so
that Socrates and Raleigh and the witches,--the ugly, the
alien, the unpopular, the bothersome-would fare better at
its hands today? It is what you and I are making it. That is
the heavy burden of our calling, but that is also its unfading
glory. That is the strain and the woe of it, leaving creases
and scars in the faces of the veterans, but that is also the
heartening appeal of it, reflecting light and joy and hope in
the faces of the new recruits, eager to join the fray and fill
the thinning ranks. Here is the age-long battle, worthy of the
best that we or they can offer. Here is the combat and the
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travail, but beyond are the sunlit hills to be gained at any
cost of blood and sweat and agony. For "the path of the just
is as the shining light, that shineth more and more unto the
perfect day."
Sometimes secreted in ancient forms and ceremonies one
finds the inner life and meaning of an institution revealed in
all its essence. I felt this not long ago while reading the form
of oath administered even now in all its ancient beauty to the
grand jurors of the county. You will find it in the Code of
Criminal Procedure; but one not greatly different is in use
by our English brethren in their home across the seas, and
Sir Frederick Pollock has traced it back, in germ at least, to
the days of the Saxon kings. In fitness and beauty and impressiveness it rivals the famous Hippocratic oath, the glory
and the pride of our brethren, the physicians. Here is its
form as it has endured through all the changing centuries:
"You shall diligently inquire and true presentment make, of all such matters and things as shall be
given you in charge; the counsel of the people of this
state, your fellows' and your own, you shall keep secret; you shall present no person from envy, hatred or
malice; nor shall you leave any one unpresented
through fear, favor, affection or reward, or hope
thereof; but you shall present all things truly as they
come to your knowledge, according to the best of your
understanding. So help you God !"
Like the tones of a mighty bell, these echoing notes of
adjuration bring back our straying thoughts to sanctity and
service. I cannot listen to them without a thrill. Here, I say
to myself, here indeed, secreted in this solemn formula, is the
true spirit of the law, which knows no fear nor favor. Not
all her ministers have been true to the ideal which she has
held aloft for them to follow. But here, imperishably preserved amid the grime and dust of centuries, the word has
been proclaimed, to steady us when we seem to falter, to
strengthen us when we seem to weaken, to tell us that with
all the failings and backslidings, with all the fears and all
the prejudice, the spirit is still pure.
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So today, as preacher of the ancient platitudes, I summon you, the new recruits, to do your part in this unending
struggle, the charge on the redoubts of fear and hatred and
prejudice and passion, and the injustice that is born of them.
You will need to know much more than the piffie-paffie of
procedure. You will need to know much more than law, or
rather till you know many other things not often ranked as
law, you will find that law itself is in reality unknown. As in
any other fight, you will hear the call for patience and skill
and courage and firmness and endurance. I have faith you
will not fail us. As I look into your faces, I figure to myself
what it will mean, in days to come, to the profession of the
law if you and those to follow you out of this school will
think worthily and highly of this great vocation of your
choice. What a spiritual power you will then be in the age-old
fellowship into which you are to enter! What a leavening
force you will become in this great conglomerate bar of ours,
moved as it is, at times, by the ferment of high thoughts and
fine ideals, and yet at times in danger of becoming sodden
and inert by reason of that very mass which might make it so
irresistible a power for good! How it lies with you to uplift
what is low, to erase what is false, to redeem what has been
lost, till all the world shall see, and seeing shall understand,
that union of the scholar's thought, the mystic's yearning,
the knight's ardor, and the hero's passion, which is still, in
truest moments of self-expression, the spirit of the bar! You
will not fail us, I am sure. After all, the main thing is to
dare. "As at the Olympic games," says Aristotle, "as at the
Olympic games, it is not the finest and strongest men who are
crowned, but they who enter the lists, for out of these the
prizemen are selected; so, too, in life, of the honorable and the
good, it is they who act who rightly win the prizes." The
bugle call is heard, and its echoes wake the hills.
Like Socrates and other bores, I have earned the draft of
hemlock if you choose to pass the cup.

